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The Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe: Implications for Soviet-American
Ddtente
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE, and formerly known as the European Security Conference),' which was held in Helsinki, Finland from July 30 to
August 1, 1975, prompted heated discussion both of the terms
of the Final Act of the Conference and the policy of detente,
as pursued by the Ford Administration. 2 Since the late summer
of 1975, however, the Conference has all but disappeared as a
focus for public discussions and as a consideration in the foreign policy of the United States.
1. The term Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe refers to both the
meeting of heads of state and government in Helsinki and to the lengthy process that
led up to it. Preparatory talks were held in 1972, while Stage I, a meeting of Foreign
Ministers, was held from July 3 to 7, 1973, at Helsinki. Stage II consisted of continuing
negotiations by national experts in Geneva, which ran from September 18, 1973 to July
21, 1975. Stage Ill was the meeting of heads of state and government in Helsinki from
July 30 to August 1, 1975, at which the Final Act, the product of more than two years
of bargaining, was signed by the 35 participating States: Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria;
Canada; Cyprus; Czechoslovakia; Denmark; Finland; France; German Democratic
Republic (GDR); Federal Republic of Germany (FRG); Greece; the Holy See; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Liechtenstein; Luxembourg; Malta; Monaco; the Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San Marino; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland;
Turkey; the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.); the United Kingdom; the
United States; and Yugoslavia. The only European state not present was Albania.
The history of the CSCE can be found at M. PALMER, THE PROSPECTS FOR AEUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE (1971) [hereinafter cited as PALMER]; W. KLAIBER, L.
HADuK, J. HARNED, J. SATTLER & S. WASOWSKI, ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS Ch. 2, Apps. A-T
(1973) [hereinafter cited as ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS]; W. KULSKI, THE SOVIET UNION IN
WORLD AFAIms 112-16 (1973) [hereinafter cited as KULSKI]; Russell, The Helsinki
Declaration: Brobdingnag or Lilliput?, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 242, 261-62 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Russell]; Povolny, The Soviet Union and the European Security
Conference, 18 OiRis 200 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Povolny].
The complete text of the Final Act has been published at 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1293
(1975); and 73 DEP'T STATE BULL. 323 (1975). The Final Act was divided into "Baskets"
for negotiating and drafting purposes, and each has retained its distinct status, although the Final Act is considered a single document.
2. For example, Senator Henry Jackson, a Democrat, called the Final Act "yet
another example of the sort of agreement that has become the hallmark of the NixonFord Administration." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 4, 1975, at 14. And Senator
James Buckley, a Conservative-Republican, asked, "What the devil is in it [the declaration] for the West?" TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 16. See also Buchanan, US. Weak, Blind,
Foolish in Agreeing to Divided Europe, Rocky Mountain News, July 29, 1975, at 27,
col. 1.
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The present comment is premised on the belief that an
analysis of the background of the Conference and the terms of
the Final Act serves two valuable functions. President Ford
and Secretary Kissinger presented the CSCE as "a step in the
process of detente," 3 which is currently the subject of a great
deal of unstructured, unproductive debate within the government-particularly the Congress-and among the general public-especially in the context of a Presidential election year.
The author believes that the format and the provisions of the
Final Act of the CSCE provide an excellent framework within
which to, first, define the notion of detente, and then to generate useful, informed discussion of detente, its value and its
application.
Second, the Final Act, as was foreshadowed by its limited
invocation in the context of the Portugese unrest of 1975,' can
be an important weapon in the diplomatic arsenal of the
United States. Thus both the provisions of the Final Act, in
which the participating states agreed upon criteria by which to
judge each others' actions, and the forum for evaluation in a
follow-up conference in 1977, provide a basis for an active U.S.
policy toward the Soviet Union, particularly in the human
rights field.
This comment will not deal with the question of whether
American participation in the CSCE was a good idea at the
time;, the United States has signed the Final Act, so the
question then must be, does it have value for U.S. policy, and
if so, how can it be used? In Section I, we shall examine some
of the significant provisions of the Final Act, while in Section
III, we shall analyze the legal, political and moral weight to be
3. U.S. Department of State, Briefing Paper: CSCE Background (mimeographed,
undated), at 4 [hereinafter cited as Briefing Paper].
4. Larrabee, The Soviet Union and the FinalAct of the Helsinki Summit, paper
presented at a meeting of the Atlantic Treaty Association, Feb. 23-24, 1976; reprinted
at CONG. REC. S6603 (daily ed. May 5, 1976).
5. It would be well at this point for the author to express his belief that on balance,
the Final Act is a good document, in the context of the relations of the period. Without
advocating linkage between them, the CSCE must be evaluated in light of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
in Europe talks (MBFR), and the series of agreements on Germany and Berlin concluded in 1970 to 1972. The West did not agree to anything of significance to which it
had not already agreed, and as we shall argue below, the potential for use of the Final
Act and the follow-up conference is great.
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attached to the Final Act. Finally, in Section IV, we shall formulate some conclusions about the CSCE and about detente,
and make some recommendations for the future use of the
Final Act of the CSCE in American foreign policy.
II. THE FINAL ACT
A. Questions Relating to Security in Europe
The section of the Final Act relating to security questions,
the so-called Basket One,6 has received the most attention and
criticism, but in reality it is a rather unexceptional document.
Indeed, over time, the success or failure of the CSCE will probably be evaluated in terms of the implementation, or lack
thereof, of Baskets Two and Three, those dealing with economics, technical and scientific cooperation and with human contacts.
While the provisions of Basket One, and particularly the
Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, constitute an impressive statement of high intentions, they are, with a few noteworthy exceptions, merely
reformulations of principles found in a number of multilateral
instruments, such as the United Nations Charter' and the U.N.
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,8 and bilateral
instruments such as the Soviet-West German Treaty of 1970
and the Basic Principles of Relations between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
of 1972.10 To make this point is not to ignore the significance
of the reaffirmation of such principles in the context of a European security conference, for it is that political context which
gives the Final Act the political and symbolic importance it
has."
6. There are essentially four separate parts to Basket One: a Preamble, the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States, Matters Related
to Giving Effect to Certain of the Above Principles, and the Document on ConfidenceBuilding Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament.
7. Russell, supra note 1, at 261-62.
8. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 85, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
[hereinafter referred to as the Friendly Relations Declaration]. The Declaration is also
found in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (I. Brownlie ed. 1972).
9. L. WHETTEN, GERMANY'S OSTPOLITIK: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
AND THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

224 (1971).

10. 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 756 (1972); 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 898 (1972).

11. President Ford continually stressed that "we are not committing ourselves
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The text of the Principles closely parallels the principles
enunciated in the U.N. Friendly Relations Declaration, which
was primarily a Soviet initiative to codify the notion of peaceful coexistence as a matter of international law." Indeed, several principles are taken almost verbatim, with only stylistic
changes.
Principle I of the Final Act deals with the sovereign equality of states and respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty,
such as juridical equality, territorial integrity, and political
independence.'3 Two parts of this principle deserve closer attention. One is the sentence which states that "frontiers can be
changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful
means and by agreement." The significance of this provision
is seen in conjunction with Principle III, on the inviolability of
frontiers.
It has long been recognized that a paramount concern of
Soviet foreign policy has been the acceptance of existing frontiers in Europe, in particular the Oder-Neisse line and the frontier between the two Germanies.' 4 Indeed, such an acknowledgement has been linked with the idea of a European security
conference for years.' 5 In Principle III, the Soviet Union obtained recognition of this long-sought-after objective. It states:
"the Participating States regard as inviolable all one anothers'
frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and
therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers."'"
This principle, although sought for so long by the Soviets,
and criticized so loudly in the West, is, in essence, nothing the
beyond what we are already committed to by our own moral and legal standards and
by more formal treaty agreements, such as the U.N. Charter and Declaration of
Human Rights." U.S. NEwS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 4, 1975, at 18.
12. R. HIGGINS, CONFLICT OF INTEREST 101-03, 166-70 (1965); McWhinney, The
"New" Countries and the "New" International Law: The United Nations' Special
Conference on Friendly Relations and CooperationAmong States, 60 AM. J. INT'L L.
1, 3 (1966).
13. Principle I. See Russell, supra note 1, at 263-64.
14. KULSKI, supra note 1, at 114; ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 55-57;
PALMER, supra note 1, at 18; Povolny, supra note 1, at 200.
15. Stressed by Leonid Brezhnev at both the 23rd and 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), in 1966 and 1971. 23RD CONGRESS OF THE
CPSU 56 (1966); 24TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU 37 (1971); see also PALMER, supra note
1, at 5, 18.
16. Principle H. See Russell, supra note 1, at 250-53.
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parties have not heretofore accepted." The Federal Republic of
Germany (FRG), which is the state most directly affected, accepted the principle in the legally binding treaties with the
Soviet Union, Poland and the German Democratic Republic
(GDR).'8 The United States, as well, at the time of President
Nixon's historic trip to Moscow in 1972, has accepted the notion of "inviolability of frontiers" in Europe.'9 In addition to
the verbal commitments, Western practice for 30 years has
recognized the inability to change European frontiers. 0
What is new is the parallel recognition by the Soviet Union
of the possibility of peaceful change of frontiers, a provision
that was the sine qua non of West German participation in the
CSCE.Y This is seen as allowing a future reunification of Germany. Since that prospect is received rather cooly from Washington to Paris to Moscow, the concession was of symbolic
2
rather than of actual political significance.
Perhaps it would be best to state what Principle III does
not do, for meanings have been attached to the Final Act that
do not have any firm basis in its provisions. As much as the
Soviet Union would wish otherwise, the Final Act does not
constitute formal recognition of European frontiers, as would
a peace treaty. Western participants, and President Ford in
particular, have made this reading of the Final Act quite
clear.Y
Essentially, the two provisions mark acknowledgement of
the political reality that the risks inherent in keeping open the
option of non-peaceful challenges to existing frontiers are simply too great in a nuclear world, indeed, if such challenges were
17. Id. at 249.
18. W. KULSKI, GERMANY AND POLAND: FROM WAR TO PEACEFUL RELATIONS Chs. 8,
9 (1976); KULSKI, supra note 1, at 132-37.
19. Joint Communique issued after the visit of President Nixon to the Soviet
Union, May 29, 1972. 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 899 (1972); N.Y. Times, May 30, 1972, at
18, col. 4.
20. See e.g., ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 61.
21. Russell, supra note 1, at 252-53; Schmidt, What Americans, Soviets Gain from
Helsinki Charter, Christian Science Monitor, July 21, 1975, at 1, col. 4; TIME, Aug. 4,
1975, at 21; Briefing Paper, supra note 3, at 3.
22. KULSKI, supra note 1, at 124-26; TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 21.
23. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 4, 1975, at 18; Briefing Paper, supra note
3, at 3, 4. The Congress has reaffirmed this interpretation by passing S.Res. 406. CONG.
REc. 6599-6000 (daily ed. May 5, 1976).
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ever feasible.24 Officially, however, the United States maintains that only a formal peace treaty can definitively answer
questions dealing with Germany,2 5 and still refuses to recognize
incorporation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union."
The other frequent assertion about the effect of the Final
Act is that it legitimizes Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.
For an analysis of this point, we must turn back to our consideration of Principle I, and its relation to the infamous Brezhnev
Doctrine, by which the U.S.S.R. sought to justify its invasion
of Czechoslovakia in 1968.27 In essence, the doctrine holds that
socialist states have both a right and a duty to protect the gains
of socialism wherever threatened, by whatever means. It has
also been dubbed the doctrine of "limited sovereignty."
It was frequently stressed in the preparations for Helsinki
that the West should strive for at least an implicit repudiation
of the Brezhnev Doctrine.2s The provisions of Principle I do, in
effect, contradict the underpinnings of the doctrine. 9 In addition to the reference to sovereign equality, juridical equality,
territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence,
the principle states that the participating States "will also respect each others' right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems. . . . ,30 In conjunc24. A perceptive analysis of American incapacity, and unwillingness, to challenge
the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe is found in Harsch, Ford Prepares to "Ratify
Yalta, "Christian Science Monitor, July 25, 1975, at 26, col. 3. See also note 20, supra.
25. Briefing Paper, supra note 3, at 4.
26. President Ford in U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REPORT, Aug. 4, 1975, at 18; Schmidt,
supra note 21, at 19, col. 4.
27. The author believes this to be a misleading misnomer, in that the doctrine is
merely a new formulation-in public-of old policy, as evidenced tragically in Berlin
in 1953 and in Poland and Hungary in 1956. KULSKI, supra note 1, at 313-39; J. KORBEL,
DETENTE INEUROPE: REAL OR IMAGINARY? 101-03 (1972). Other useful treatments of the
doctrine are found in T. FRANCK & E. WEISAND, WORD POLMCS 33-40 (1972) and T.
WOLFE, SOvIET POWER AND EUROPE 1945-1970 at 383-85 (1970).

28. Povolny, supra note 1, at 201, 218; N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1973, at 3, col. 6.
29. Russell, supra note 1, at 255-57; the Brezhnev Doctrine, however, has been
declared dead before. Schwebel, The Brezhnev Doctrine Repealed and Peaceful Coexistence Enacted, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 816 (1972). Like the reports of the death of Mark
Twain, the reports of the demise of the Brezhnev Doctrine are greatly exaggerated, in
the view of the author. One should have no doubts that if the Soviet Union perceived
a threat to its control in Europe, it would act just as it did in Berlin, in Hungary and
in Czechoslovakia, doctrine or no doctrine. Perhaps the area where the potential for
East-West conflict is greatest-and the reach of the Brezhnev Doctrine most
uncertain-is in Yugoslavia after Tito's death. ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at
60.
30. Principle I.
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tion with Principle VI, on the non-intervention in internal affairs, "regardless of their mutual relations," and the statement
in the Preamble that the principles should govern relations
between states "irrespective of their political, economic or social systems," 3 ' this would seem to pre-empt the idea, basic to
the Brezhnev Doctrine, that relations between socialist countries are governed by different principles than those between
other states.32 While this interpretation should not be overestimated33-such agreements inevitably fall when they conflict
with perceptions of vital national interest-its symbolic value
should be seen to be as great to the West as is that to the Soviet
Union of the inviolability principle. Just as the Soviets are
likely to use for propaganda purposes those provisions it favors,
so the West should use those provisions which by their terms
contradict the Brezhnev Doctrine.
The other Principles of the Declaration on Principles add
little that has not been previously agreed to. They speak of
refraining from the threat or use of force, 34 the territorial integrity of states, 35 the peaceful settlement of disputes, 36 non31. Preamble, para. 5. See Povolny, supra note 1, at 225, for a discussion of Soviet
resistance to this provision. It should be noted that the Yugoslavs pushed this idea
strongly. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1972, at 11, col. 1.
32. On the concept of international law between socialist states, see G. TUNKIN,
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 427-47 (W. Butler trans. 1974); KULSKI, supra note 1,
at 296-300; Lapenna, The Soviet Concept of "Socialist" International Law, in THE
YEARBOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS 1975 at 242 (1975); Shurshalov, International Law in
Relations among Socialist States, in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (G. Tunkin
ed. 1969).
33. Secretary of State Kissinger apparently felt this interpretation to be valid. He
characterized General Secretary Brezhnev's Helsinki speech, which stressed noninterference, as "conciliatory" and as pointing "both ways." It should be noted in this
regard that Brezhnev made no exceptions for socialist states in his speech. For the text
of his speech, see CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, Aug. 27, 1975, at 12. See also
Russell, supra note 1, at 256 n.39; Osborne, Ford in Europe, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 16 &
23, 1975, at 10; NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11, 1975, at 17-18; Denver Post, July 31, 1975, at 1,
col. 3; Denver Post, Aug. 10, 1975, at 10, col. 1.
34. Principle II. See ERA OF NEGOTATIONS, supra note 1, at 60-61; Russell, supra
note 1, at 264-65.
35. Principle IV. It is significant that this principle stresses that no occupation of
another state's territory is legal, which applies to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia (not ratified by treaty until 1970, in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Mutual Assistance, signed May 6, 1970. 735 U.N.T.S. 218). Russell, supra note 1, at
265-66. It is also contended that the "illegal" incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania and
Estonia by the Soviet Union are covered by this principle. Id. at 266. Cf. Mitchell &
Leonhard, Changing Soviet Attitudes towardInternationalLaw, 6 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 227, 294 (1976).
36. Principle V. See Russell, supra note 1, at 266-67.
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intervention in internal affairs,3" equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples," cooperation among states," and the
fulfilment in good-faith of obligations under international
law." Principle VII, on human rights, will be discussed infra.
The last important aspect of Basket One is the
'confidence-building" measures accepted by the participating
States.4' Originally proposed by Canada,4 2 and actively supported by Yugoslavia and Romania,43 they were opposed for a
time by the Soviet Union, but were accepted at a fairly early
stage in the preparatory discussions." These measures include
prior notification of military maneuvers, exchange of observers
and prior notification of major military movements.4 5 The effect of these "confidence-building" measures is by no means
clear, as they have been invoked only in limited circumstan46
ces.
B. Cooperation in Economics, Science, Technology and the
Environment
The provisions of Basket Two, although receiving perhaps
least attention of the provisions of the Final Act, may in the
long-run be among the most important results for the CSCE.
Cooperation in this area has been an agenda item proposed by
the Soviet Union since 1966. 41 In this light it has been suggested
37. Principle VI. See Russell, supra note 1, at 267-68. This principle should be
read in conjunction with Principle VII; thus, human rights are not exclusively within
the domestic jurisdiction of a state. Id. at 268.
38. Principle VIII. See Russell, supra note 1, at 269-70.
39. Principle IX. This principle recognizes the roles of "governments, institutions,
organizations and persons" in the promotion of cooperation among states (emphasis
added). The socialist states generally deny any applicability of international law to
individuals. Id. at 270.
40. Principle X. See Russell, supra note 1, at 270-71.
41. Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security
and Disarmament.
42. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1972, at 15, col. 5.
43. Sulzberger, A Cold Peace for a Cold War, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1972, at 31,
col. 6.
44. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1973, at 8, col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 23, 1973, at 1, col.
1.
45. This last provision is heavily qualified, as the parties "may at their own
discretion" notify of such movements.
46. See report in U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 9, 1976, at 28, 29.
47. Povolny, supra note 1, at 206. See generally M. GOLDMAN, DETENTE AND
DOLLARS (1975) [hereinafter cited as GOLDMAN]; Z. NAGORSKI, JR., THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF EAST-WEST TRADE (1974); S. PISAR, COEXISTENCE AND COMMERCE (1970); G. STEIBEL,
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for some time that a central reason for the Soviet desire for
detente is to obtain trade and technology from Western industrialized countries." Economics and technical cooperation have
been NATO discussion topics since at least 1969.11
There is no general agreement as to the proper role that
trade and economic relations should-or can-play in the general relations between states of differing social systems. Three
major positions can be identified, each of which achieves a
measure of support in the various analyses of detente.
The first position derives from the proposition that trade
is and/or should be used as a means to desired political ends.
This position is exemplified by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment
to the Trade Act of 1974.50 The Trade Act, finally passed on
January 3, 1975,1' was designed to implement the Trade Agreement of 1972, one of the major results of the Nixon-Brezhnev
summit of June 1972.5 The key provision was that granting

most-favored-nation (MFN) status 53 to the Soviet Union. The
Jackson Amendment, which passed with the Act, conditioned
such a grant, however, on a showing to the Congress by the
country seeking MFN status that free emigration was allowed
to all its citizens."4 The condition was, after some appearance
of acceptance, heatedly rejected by the Soviet Union, which
5
dismissed it as meddling in the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R.
This position of "politicizing" trade is based upon a belief
DETENTE: PROMISES AND PITFALLS ch. 4 (1975) [hereinafter cited as STEIBEL]; ERA OF
NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 61-66.

48. KULSKI, supra note 1, at 57-61; ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 61.
49. PALMER, supra note 1, at 14.
50. For the history of the Jackson Amendment, see V. PETROV, U.S.-SovIET DETENTE: PAST AND FUTURE 18-23 (1975) [hereinafter cited as PETROV]; STEIBEL, supra
note 47, at 39-45; Fitzpatrick, Soviet-American Trade, 1972-1974: A Summary, 15 VA.
J. INT'L L. 39, 67-68 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fitzpatrick]; Editor's Foreword,
Soviet-American Trade in a Legal Perspective, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 217, 21718 (1975); 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 652 (1975). See also 18 ORais 630 (1974); 18 ORaIs 983,
987-90 (1975).
51. P.L. 93-618 (1975).
52. Fitzpatrick, supra note 50, at 40-43; PETROV, supra note 47, at 16.
53. On MFN status with the Soviet Union, see Usenko, Most-Favored-Nation
Treatmpnt in Soviet-American Trade Relations, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 243
(1975); Metzger, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment of Imports to the United States
from the US.S.R., 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 251 (1975); Fitzpatrick, supra note 50,
at 66-68.
54. Editor's Foreword, supra note 50, at 217.
55. Id. at 218; 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 652 (1975).
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that the fruits of the economic relations between the U.S.S.R.
and the U.S.A. are far greater for the former than for the latter.
Thus the argument runs that the chronically inefficient Soviet
economy requires infusions of technology, capital and goods
from the West, and that such infusions, while returning little
to the West, greatly strengthen Soviet power in the world as
well as improve the position of the leadership of the Soviet
Union domestically. 6 Therefore, one analyst has concluded,
"We should not help the Soviet Union economically and technologically unless we receive important political concessions in
return .

. . . "s'

Those concessions can be either in the sphere

of politics and security"8 or human rights. 59
This variation of Dr. Kissinger's famous "linkage" theory
was criticized recently in this JOURNAL by Professor Harold
Berman. He argued that the linkage is "only as strong as the
weakest link."" That is, in a linkage situation, a deterioration
in economic relations could lead to a deterioration in the political sphere, as well as the inverse. He suggests that it would be
a mistake to allow economic fluctuations to inhibit political
relations, just as it would be a mistake to allow political ups
and downs to determine levels of economic intercourse.6 ' To do
so would be to return to the "anachronistic" policies of the
1950s.62
Two further points have been put forward in this regard.
First, Berman argues that there should be some symmetry between claims and responses in international relations, that the
latter should be appropriate to the former. It is his contention
that a policy as suggested above would be inappropriate and
asymmetrical. 3 Second, the fate of the Jackson Amendment
56. G. NUTTER, KISSINGER'S GRAND DESIGN 23 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
NurrER]; Conquest, A New Russia? A New World?, 53 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 482, 493 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Conquest].
57. Nu'rER, supra note 56, at 23.
58. Political concessions were suggested by NutrrER, supra note 56, at 23. The use
of trade for political concessions has been suggested by members of a Democratic study
group. Denver Post, Feb. 15, 1976, at 27, col. 2.
59. This is the approach upon which the Jackson Amendment was based.
60. Berman, The Interaction of Law and Politics in Trade Relations Between the
United States and the Soviet Union, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 231, 234 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Berman].
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 234-35.
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certainly suggests that the Soviet leadership will be highly unlikely to agree to such demands, depending of course on the
degree to which the Soviet Union needs the goods, credits or
technology in issue.64
The second major position on the role of trade is that it
should be carried out in a politics-free environment to the mutual benefit of the parties; it is thus essentially a free trade
notion. Professor Berman has argued for this approach of concentrating on economic advantage-"regardless of how good or
bad our political relations may be and without the purpose of
securing particular political advantages." 5 At the heart of this
position is the concept of MFN status," which means essentially that each trading partner should be treated equally.
Two main criticisms have been leveled at this position.
First, there are those, such as Robert Conquest, who contend
that such mutually profitable trade is impossible "for the
perfectly simple reason that Russia has practicallynothing the
West needs" (emphasis in the original)." It is argued that there
is very little trade in the sense of a two-way flow of goods, but
rather deals like the grain deal which are goods for cash, or even
more often, goods and long-term credits to allow payment.
The second argument is that deals that are made, while
profitable for the individual corporation, are not necessarily
good for the United States. 6 Conquest cites Lenin who allegedly said of Western hemp manufacturers, "they would happily turn a fast buck by selling him the rope to hang them
with.", 9
The third major position is that trade helps to bring about
closer relations, and perhaps, peace. 0 This is akin to the func64. Id. at 235; Fitzpatrick, supra note 50, at 66-67.
65. Berman, supra note 60, at 232. Averell Harriman, the former Ambassador to
the Soviet Union, and a leading Democratic foreign affairs expert, recently called for
"normalization of trade" with the U.S.S.R. Denver Post, Feb. 15, 1976, at 27, col. 2.
See also, Fritchey, Uncle Sam Will Be Uncle Sap if the Grain Deal is Cancelled, Rocky
Mountain News, Feb. 23, 1976, at 29, col. 1; Kennan, Is Detente Worth Saving?,
SATURDAY REVIEW, Mar. 6, 1976, at 12, 17. Like Professor Berman, Kennan argues for
exploitation of those "exchanges ... which would be mutually profitable." Id. at 17.
66. See note 53, supra.
67. Conquest, supra note 56, at 491.
68. "[Tlhis is emphatically not a case of what is good for Corporation X being
good for America." Id.
69. Id.
70. NLrTEa, supra note 56, at 19; Berman, supra note 60, at 231-32. It is also
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tional approach to international relations,7' and the idea of a
"tangle of hopes" that Professor Haas has invoked in similar
analysis.7 2 Thus, Samuel Pisar has written that "[t]he tender
sword that will open the East is economic and industrial coop''
eration and the human freedoms that go with it. 1
This creation of interdependence and thus closer relations
is refuted as "extraordinary naivety."'' It is argued that history
shows no such correlation; indeed, in the 20th century most of
the states that went to war were close trading partners. For
example, before both World Wars, Germany was Russia's largest trading partner.7 5 The critics of this position recall Norman
Angell's eloquent pre-World War I book, The GreatIllusion, in
which he argued that the possibility of gain from war was rendered impossible by the network of commercial relations in the
world.7"
It should be noted that the second two positions are not
necessarily incompatible, and can be accepted together. Indeed, we shall see that elements of both are present in the Final
Act.
In the Preamble to Basket Two, the participating States
stated their conviction "that their efforts to develop cooperation in the fields of trade, industry, science and technology, the environment and other areas of economic activity contribute to the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe
and in the world as a whole."7 7 Further, they reaffirmed "their
contended that such trade would make life better for the average citizen in the Soviet
Union. ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 65.
71. D. MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM (1966); E. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATIONSTATE (1964).
72. E. HAAS, TANGLE OF HOPES (1967). Secretary Kissinger refers to "a network of
vested interests." Speech reprinted at 14 THE ATLANTIc COMM. Q. 20, 25 (1976).
73. Pisar, The Changing Economic and Legal Environment for East-West
Investment, 10 INT'L LAW. 3 (1976).
74. Conquest, supra note 56, at 490.
75. Id. NUTTER, supra note 56, at 19. Cf. GOLDMAN, supra note 47, at 278-79. "The
belief that trade leads to peace can sometimes be as much a product of fanciful hopes
as of actual experience. Nonetheless, on balance, the likelihood of peaceful international relations seems to be greater with a reasonable level of mutually beneficial
foreign trade than without it." Id. at 279.
76. NtrrrEa, supra note 56, at 19.
77. Preamble to Document on Cooperation in the Field of Economics, of Science
and Technology and of the Environment, para. 1.
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will to intensify such cooperation between one another irrespec7' 8
tive of their [economic and social] systems.
In the section on commercial exchanges, the participating
States agreed to promote the expansion of trade and "to ensure
conditions favorable to such development." 9 In addition, they
agreed to "foster a steady growth of trade while avoiding as far
' 80
as possible abrupt fluctuations in their trade.
They further agreed to "endeavor to reduce or progressively eliminate all kinds of obstacles to the development of
trade." 8' And more specifically, they "recognize[d] the beneficial effects which can result for the development of trade from
'82
the application of most-favored-nation treatment.
The various sections of Basket Two consist of 33 pages of
"guidelines and concrete recommendations,"" for the expansion of trade and cooperation in these areas. Among the undertakings are those to expand business contacts, 4 to improve the
quantity and quality of economic and commercial information,8 5 and to promote industrial cooperation and projects of
common interest. 86
In science and technology, cooperation is foreseen in areas
such as agriculture, energy production and conservation, transportation, computer technology, space, medicine and a host of
other areas.87 The participating States also agreed to cooperate
in the environmental field-air pollution, water pollution,
human settlements, and natural resources.8 The document
also contains provisions on the promotion of tourism," and the
improvement of the conditions of migrant laborers.90
Id. at para. 4.
Section 1, para. 4.
Section 1, para. 10.
Section 1, para. 9.
Section 1, para. 5.
Preamble, para. 9.
Section on Business Contacts and Facilities.
Section on Economics and Commercial Information.
Industrial Cooperation and Projects of Common Interest.
Science and Technology, Possibilities for Improving Cooperation. See ERA OF
NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 69-70.
88. Environment.
89. Promotion of Tourism. See ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 67-68.
90. Economic and Social Aspects of Migrant Labor.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
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Cooperationin Humanitarianand other Fields
The Third Basket of the Final Act of the CSCE, dealing
with human contacts-the flow of information and cooperation
in cultural and educational relations between states-was the
most contested part of the long negotiations leading to the
Helsinki summit. Western pressure for the "free flow of people,
ideas and information"'" was countered throughout the negotiations by Soviet resistance and claims of "ideological subversion.""2
While presented from 1970 onward as a joint NATO
C.

position,9 3 Britain, Germany and other Western European

states were the prime movers in the areas of human contacts. 4
American policy was indifferent until 1974, when a more vigorous policy was followed. 5 The Western position from 1974 forward was essentially that there would be no Conference, and
particularly no summit of heads of state, without Soviet acceptance of the essentials of Basket Three. 6
Western states were not alone in seeking freer contacts
across national frontiers. The Yugoslavs, in particular, stressed
the need for "a progressive opening of all possible channels for
contacts and cooperation.""
91. PALMER, supra note 1, at 51, 104; Palmer, A European Security Conference:
Preparationsand Procedures, 28 WORLD TODAY 36, 42 (1972); Povolny, supra note 1,
at 223.

92. N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1972, at 12, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1973, at 10,
col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1973, at 8, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 1;
Korey, Good Intentions, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 2 & 9, 1975, at 6 [hereinafter cited
as Korey]; Povolny, supra note 1, at 225.
On human rights generally in the Soviet Union, see Reddaway, Dissent in the
Soviet Union, DISSENT, Spring 1976, at 136 [hereinafter cited as Reddaway]. For
eloquent and informative descriptions from within the Soviet Union, see A. SAKHARov,
MY COUNTRY AND THE WORLD 11-62 (1975); and R. MEDVEV,

ON SOCIAUST DEMOCRACY

chs. 4, 9, 10, 12 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MEDVEDEV]; and Amalrik, Arrest on
Suspicion of Courage, HARPER'S MONTHLY, July 1976, at 37.
See also the Soviet Constitution of 1936, Ch. X. It is found in BASIC DOCUMENTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 25-29 (1. Brownlie ed. 1971).

93. See PALMER, supra note 1, at 104, for an excerpt from the NATO Communique
of Dec. 1970 on the ESC.
94. Korey, supra note 92, at 6; N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1973, at 15, col. 1 (Statements by Chancellor Brandt of the FRG and Foreign Secretary Home of the UK).
95. Korey, supra note 92, at 7.
96. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1972, at 15, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1973, at 10, col.
1.
97. Acimovic, The European Problem and the Perspectives on its Settlement, in
PROBLEMES DE LA CONFERENCE EUROPEENE POUR LA COOPERATION ET LA SECURITE 11, 17
(1971).
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The Soviet Union, and its socialist allies (it is interesting
to note that Romania, which received MFN status just prior to
the CSCE, and is highly regarded in the West for its independence of the Soviet Union, is at least as strong on this point as
is the Soviet Union98 ), were highly critical of Basket Three from
the outset, seeing it as an invitation to "subversive activities"99
and the introduction of "anti-culture" into socialist society. 0
In the earlier stages of the conference negotiations, the Soviets
accepted the notion of human contacts as long as they took
place "on the basis of respect for the sovereignty, laws and
customs of each country."'' This idea was firmly rejected by
the West as allowing selective interpretation of the provisions
of the Basket, and was eventually dropped by the Soviets in
1973.102

It is instructive to note what provisions the Soviet Union
did not accept, and were thus not included in the Final Act.
The United States had sought Soviet agreement to stop jamming Western radio broadcasts into Eastern Europe and the
U.S.S.R., but failed.' In addition, the Western phrase "free
flow of people, ideas and information" is not found in the Final
Act despite significant pressure for its inclusion. 104 Much of the
substance of the concept, however, is incorporated in the
human contacts sections.
Before briefly reviewing the provisions of Basket Three, we
must return to Basket One, the Declaration on Principles
Guiding Relations between Participating States. 5 Principle
VII concerns "Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or
98. See KULSKI, supra note 1, at 335. Romania's "independence" is limited to
foreign affairs, while the internal regime is perhaps the harshest in Eastern Europe,
with the possible exception of Bulgaria. Id. at 335-38. Six Months After: The East
European Response to Helsinki, 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 59, 64 (1976).
99. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
100. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1973, at 8, col. 5. "Anti-culture is 'pornography, the cult
of violence, racism and slanderous, false propoganda.'" Povolny, supra note 1, at 22526.
101. N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1973, at 3, col.
6; Povolny, supra note 1, at 226.
102. Id.
103. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1972, at 15, col. 5; Rocky Mountain News, July 29, 1975,
at 3, col. 5.
104. Povolny, supra note 1, at 226.
105. See Section ll.A supra.
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belief."' 16 The provisions of Principle VII are not new, in that
they parallel very closely the language of both the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights' 7 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 08 What is significant, however, is the reaffirmation of the principle in this highly political
document on peace and security, thereby underscoring the belief that human rights and their implementation are matters
of internationalconcern, both in their own right and because
of their relationship to peace and security.0 9
Indeed in Principle VII, the participating States agreed to
"endeavor jointly and separately, including in co-operation
with the United Nations, to promote universal and effective
respect for them [human rights and fundamental freedoms].""l 0 Thus the participating States have recognized that
human rights issues are legitimate subjects for bilateral and
multilateral negotiations, as well as within the framework of
the United Nations. As we shall argue below, this recognition
of the proper scope of concern, in conjunction with the followup conference in 1977,"' provides an important political tool for
the West in dealing with the Soviet Union.
Two further points on Principle VII are appropriate here.
First, the Principle explicitly recognizes the rights of national
minorities to "equality before the law [and] . . . the actual
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms." The
participating States further agreed to "protect their [the minorities] legitimate interests in this sphere." '1 l2 We will discuss
106. Principle VII, Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States.
107. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948), arts. 18 and 2 [hereinafter cited as Declaration]. The Universal Declaration
is conveniently found in BAsic DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 144 (I. Brownlie ed.
1972).
108. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature,
Dec. 19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Covenant]. The Covenant is also found in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (I. Brownlie ed. 1972).
The Covenant came into force on March 23, 1976. See After 30 Years, an International Bill of Human Rights, 12 U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Apr. 1976, at 50.
109. This relationship is made explicit in the Final Act, both in the Preamble to
the Declaration and in Principle VII itself, at para. 5.
110. Principle VII, para. 6. The U.S.S.R. has ratified the Covenant. 12 U.N.
MONTHLY CHRONICLE. Apr. 1976, at 50, 52.
111. See infra, Section II.D.
112. Principle VII, para. 4.
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this point further below. Second, the Principle invoked the
U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration, the states agreeing to "act in conformity with the purposes and principles
[contained therein]." The International Covenants on Human
Rights were also cited, recognizing that many of the participating States were bound by them, including the Soviet Union."'
The provisions of Basket Three, which cover 33 pages, were
adopted by the participating States "conscious that increased
cultural and education exchanges, broader dissemination of
information, contacts between people, and the solution of humanitarian problems will contribute to the attainment of these
aims" ["the strengthening of peace and understanding among
peoples and to the spiritual enrichment of the human
].' This again constitutes recognition, alpersonality ..
beit in a non-legal document, of the international nature of
issues of human rights and contacts.
The major significance of the provisions of Basket
Three-and the aspect which makes their future use possible
in the context of the follow-up conference-is that they provide
a number of specific areas to enhance transnational communication, contacts and cooperation, and provide for unilateral,
bilateral and multilateral means to discuss and achieve these
ends. To a great degree, what the Final Act does, therefore, is
to give both specific content to many of the more general
human rights principles" 5 in the context of a conference of all
the states of Europe,"' and a process for continuing consideration and negotiation of these specific ends, and for evaluation
of compliance with them.
The Basket consists of four sections. Section One deals
with human contacts, the participating States "mak[ing] it
their aim to facilitate freer movement and contacts . . .declare their readiness . . . to conclude agreements or arrangements among themselves, as may be needed . ." to imple113. Principle VII, para. 8.
114. Preamble, para. 1, 2.
115. The need for explication of community expectations as to the content of
human rights prescriptions is argued in McDougal, Human Rights and World Public
Order: Principles of Content and Procedure for Clarifying General Community
Policies, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 387 (1974).
116. Europe for purposes of the CSCE includes the United States and Canada,
but excludes Albania, which would not attend the conference.
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ment those aims.' 7 The states further expressed "their intention now to proceed to the implementation" of the provisions
of Section One." 8
Among these provisions are those dealing with contacts
and regular meetings on the basis of family ties"9 and reunification of families across national frontiers' 0 (the most freqent
reason given for Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R.). It is
clear that these specific provisions are subclasses of the right
of all persons, protected by both the Universal Declaration and
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,' to leave and enter
their country. The importance of these provisions, then, is that
they are specific, thus making evaluation of their implementation far easier than for more general formulations.
Further provisions of Section One include those dealing
with marriage between citizens of different states,' 2 facilitation
of travel for personal and professional reasons,' 3 improvement
of conditions for tourism,'24 encouragement of meetings among
young people,' 5 and other expansion of transnational contacts.'2
Section Two was designed to "facilitate the freer and wider
dissemination of information of all kinds,""7' ' in order to contribute "to the growth of confidence between peoples."'2 8 Thus
the participating States "express[ed] their intention" to improve the circulation of, access to, and exchange of all kinds of
information.'1 They agreed to facilitate dissemination of oral
information,'30 printed information in the form of newspapers,
117. Section 1, Preamble, para. 5, 6.
118. Id. at para. 7.
119. Section 1(a).
120. Section 1(b).
121. See arts. 13 and 16(3) of the Declaration, supra note 107; arts. 12 and 23(1)
of the Covenant, supra note 108.
122. Section 1(c). This again is covered in general terms by the Declaration, supra
note 107, art. 16, and the Covenant, supra note 108, art. 23.
123. Section 1(d).
124. Section 1(e).
125. Section 1(f).
126. Section 1(h).
127. Section 2, Preamble, para. 6.
128. Id. at para. 2.
129. Section 2(a).
130. Section 2(a)(i). The Soviets, however, did not agree to cease jamming Western broadcasts, see text accompanying note 103. See also ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra
note 1, at 68-69.
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periodicals and other publications, 3 ' and filmed and broadcast
information.' 2 The participants further agreed to work to improve the conditions under which journalists work, to ease visa
requirements, travel opportunities, and communication with
local sources. 3 In addition it was agreed that journalists
should be allowed to "transmit completely, normally and rapidly" their information,'34 and that legitimate journalistic activity "will neither render journalists liable to expulsion nor
otherwise penalize them."'3 5
Section Three deals with cooperation and exchanges in the
field of culture. The participating States agreed to extend relations between governmental and non-governmental organizations, increase mutual knowledge between cultures, promote
fuller access to books and artistic works and performances, and
to further develop contacts and cooperation among artists and
others involved in cultural activities. 31 Section Four deals with
cooperation and exchanges in the field of education. It provides
for expansion of contacts and exchanges, improvement of access for foreign students and teachers to each other's educational institutions, facilitation of travel and scholarships, cooperation in research in the sciences and humanities, as well as
foreign languages and civilizations, and the promotion of coop137
eration in teaching methods.
Of note in Sections Three and Four, and particularly relevant to the Soviet Union, is a special provision recognizing the
contribution and rights of minorities or regional cultures in the
fields of culture and education. 38 The Soviet Union is a multinational state, and non-Russian nationalities make up one-half
of the population of the U.S.S.R.3 9 The Russian people are the
131. Section 2(a)(ii).
132. Section 2(a)(iii).
133. Section 2(c). The Soviet Union has agreed to relax restrictions on travel,
although it is by no means unlimited. Denver Post, Mar. 2, 1976, at 18, col. 5.
134. Section 2(c).
135. Id.
136. Section 3.
137. Section 4.
138. Sections 3, 4. See also text accompanying note 112. Art. 27 of the Covenant,
supra note 108, recognizes the rights of minorities in protection of their culture and
language.
139. W. KULSKI, THE Soviet REGIME 54-59 (1963); Ulam, Smug Russians, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 27, 1976, at 12, 13. On minorities generally in the Soviet Union,
see Reddaway, supra note 92, at 143-49; MEDVEDEV, supra note 92, at chs. 4, 12;
Keenan, Soviet Time Bomb, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 21 & 28, 1976, at 17.
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"leading force of the Soviet Union and. . . the first among the
equal and friendly family of the Soviet nations."' 40 While the
rights of other nationalities are officially recognized-including
the right to secede-the "russification" of the "Soviet people"
and the elimination of "bourgeois nationalism" are seen as real
threats to the non-Russian nationalities.'
As in the case of the provisions of Basket Two, the degree
of implementation over time of the commitments made at Helsinki will determine whether the CSCE can be evaluated a
success or a failure. In the conclusion, we shall suggest an approach to these human rights issues that will utilize Basket
Three in a positive manner to bring about a loosening of some
of the strictness presently found in a number of European societies, Socialist and Western alike.
D. Follow-up to the Conference
Basket Four has been the least discussed part of the Final
Act, yet if the Act is to have any force over time, much of that
force will derive from the pressures implicit in this last basket.
The prospect for a conference in 1977 should make each participating State more aware of its commitments, and of the price
of failure to implement those commitments.
The idea of a permanent standing committee to supervise
implementation of the Final Act was originally a Soviet initiative.'4 2 While the NATO powers were indecisive on a permanent organization,' 43 several small Eastern European states
pressed the idea forcefully in the negotiations. Over time, as
the Romanians and Yugoslavs, in particular, continued their
strong support, the Soviet Union became less and less supportive as the Soviet leadership came to see such an organ as a
potential threat to Soviet policies both in Eastern Europe and
at home.' 4
The compromise arrangements eventually achieved at
Helsinki fall into three parts. First, the participating States
140. W. KULSKI, THE SoviET REGIME 127 (1963).
141. Id. at 127-35; Reddaway, supra note 92, at 144.
142. PALMER, supra note 1, at 56-58; ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 70-71;
Povolny, supra note 1, at 224; N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1973, at 8, col. 2. It was generally
perceived as an attempt to replace NATO (and the Warsaw Pact). ERA OF
NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 1, at 70.
143. PALMER, supra note 1, at 56; Povolny, supra note 1, at 226.
144. TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 21.
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resolved to act to implement the provisions of the Final Act
through unilateral actions,'4 5 bilateral negotiations,"'4 and multilaterally, by meetings of experts and within the framework of
existing international organizations, such as the Economic
Commission for Europe and UNESCO.'4 7
Second, the parties resolved to "continue the multilateral
process initiated by the Conference,"' 48 through a "thorough
exchange of views,"' 4 9 and the holding of meetings of experts
to "define the appropriate modalities for the holding of other
meetings which could include further similar meetings and the
"I"
possibility of a new Conference; ....
Third, the Final Act provides for the first follow-up meeting to be held in Belgrade in 1977.11 The symbolic importance
of the choice of Belgrade, and the potentialities for the use of
the follow-up procedures, will be discussed further in Section
IV.
III. LEGAL, POLITICAL AND MORAL EFFECT OF THE FINAL ACT
The status of the Final Act of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe is even more tenuous than that
ascribed to political treaties by President DeGaulle. He commented that "treaties are like young girls and roses; they do not
last long."' 2 Political instruments, be they treaty or non-legal
instruments, retain validity only so long as the instruments are
seen to further the interests which originally created the basis
53
of agreement.
The point that the Final Act is not a treaty or a legal
document has been stressed heavily by President Ford' 54 and
145. Section l(a).
146. Section 1(b).
147. Section 1(c).
148. Section 2.
149. Section 2(a).
150. Section 2(b).
151. Section 3.
152. That DeGaulle made this statement shortly after ratification of the FrancoGerman Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship in 1963 certainly amplifies its meaning.
W. KULSKI, DEGAULLE AND THE WORLD 278 (1966).
153. This point is well made in J. MILLER, THE NATURE OF POLITICS 148 (1962).
154. "I would emphasize that the document I will sign is neither a treaty nor is it
legally binding on any participating State." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 4, 1975,
at 18.
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many commentators. 5 5 The signatures of the heads of government were made "mindful of the high political significance
which they attach to the results of the Conference, and declaring their determination to act in accordance with the provisions" of the Final Act. 15 The document has been termed a
"declaration of good intentions,"157 and a "statement of political resolve."'5 8 As such it is said to resemble the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Friendly Relations
Declaration.6 0
General Secretary Brezhnev, however, has intimated that
some provisions are "of a binding nature,"'' apparently in reference to principles of inviolability of frontiers and noninterference, the provisions to which the Soviet Union attaches
most weight and importance. While the assertion is evidence
that the U.S.S.R. will probably interpret the Final Act selectively, it is unfounded. It is true that the language of the Declaration on Principles is less qualified than that of other sections,1 2 yet the participating States merely declared "their determination to respect and put into practice" those Principles,'63 and reaffirmations of the non-bindingness of the Final
Act were plentiful. In addition, at the insistence of the Western
states,' 4 the Final Act, although negotiated by "baskets,"' 1 5 is
one document, with equal weight to be attached to each sec155. See e.g., TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 16; Denver Post, Aug. 3, 1975, at 17, col. .;
Schmidt, What Americans, Soviets Gain from Helsinki Charter, Christian Science
Monitor, July 21, 1975, at 1, col. 4; Kraft, Ford May Gain Leverage at Helsinki, Denver
Post, July 30, 1975, at 22, col. 4. See also discussion in Russell, supra note 1, at 24649.
156. Basket Four, Section 4, para. 6. Since the Final Act is not a treaty or legal
agreement for purposes of art. 102 of the U.N. Charter (recognized at Section 4, para.
4), it cannot be invoked before any organ of the United Nations. Art. 102(2). See
Russell, supra note 1, at 247.
157. TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 16.
158. Briefing Paper, supra note 3, at 4.
159. In the words of one analyst, the Declaration is "no more than a general
statement of moral purpose and not a vehicle of legal obligation." D. GRIEG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (1970) [hereinafter cited as GRIEG].
160. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 8.
161. Denver Post, Aug. 17, 1975, at 19, col. 1.
162. The most frequently-used verb is "will," whereas in the human contacts
section the construction is "will favorably consider."
163. Preamble, para. 5, Declaration on Principles.
164. TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 17.
165. See discussion of each, supra, Section II.
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tion.6 6 Thus if the Soviet Union characterizes one section as
binding, other states have an equally persuasive case for the
binding nature of other provisions, such as those dealing with
human rights.
The assertion of the non-legal nature of the Final Act has
been made so frequently as to render it a truism. It is, however,
like many simplifications, misleading, and could serve to deemphasize important effects of the Final Act. The analogies to
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Friendly
Relations Declaration' 7 provide valuable insights for a balanced appraisal of the Final Act.
To say that the Universal Declaration is not a legal instrument per se is not to imply that it is devoid of legal, political
and moral effect. It has been suggested, though not totally
accepted, that the Declaration represents a norm of customary
international law,' 8 as recognized by Article 38(1)(b) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.' 9 It has also been
argued that provisions of the Universal Declaration constitute
recognized by civilized nations,' 0 as
general principles of law
7
under Article 38(1)(c).'
It is not the intention here to characterize the Final Act
as customary international law,"'7 but rather to suggest that it
166. It is true, however, that most of the provisions of the trade and human
contacts sections require bilateral or multilateral negotiations to implement them,
while the Principles are merely guides to state action. If the Soviet Union continues
to suggest greater importance for the Principles, it will be difficult consistently-although consistency is not necessarily a virtue in diplomacy-to discount
Principle VII, by which "[tihe participating States will respect human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief,
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."
167. See text accompanying notes 158-61.
168. Separate Opinion of Vice-President Ammoun in Advisory Opinion on the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (S.W. Africa), [1971] I.C.J. Reports
16. The Office of Legal Affairs of the U.N. Secretariat has written: "[fln so far as the
expectation [of compliance] is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration
may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon States." Cited
in W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 470 n.24 (3d ed. 1971).
169. Article 38: "1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: . . .(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; ..
170. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 144.
the general principles of law recognized by civilized
...
171. Article 38(1)(c):
nations .... "
172. Russell, one of the U.S. negotiators of the Final Act, has written: "It [the
Final Act] is viewed, however, as consistent with international law, and, given the
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is not totally removed from the sphere of law. First, as time
passes and the participating States conform to the various provisions, if in fact they do conform-which is of course the ultimate test of the success or failure of the CSCE-the Final Act
could perhaps contain general principles by which states might
be bound. Second, as provisions of the Final Act parallel or
duplicate such instruments as the Universal Declaration, the
Friendly Relations Declaration and the Charter itself,' 3 the
totality of pronouncements, in conjunction with State practice,
can be evidence of customary norms of international law.
In addition, a significant indirect legal effect of both the
Universal Declaration and the Friendly Relations Declaration
derives from their nature as "evidence of the consensus . . . on
the meaning and elaboraton of the Charter."'7 The Final Act
can be seen in this light as well. For the participating States,
it can be seen as a reformulation and refinement of the principles governing state behavior set out in the Charter and as
such, arguably, have indirect legal effect,' 5 or at least heightened political effect.
As the legal effects discussed above are tenuous at best,
the substantial effects of the Final Act will likely be political
and moral. Again, reference to the experience of the Universal
Declaration exhibits the type of influence that a non-binding
instrument can generate. As the Declaration itself states, it is
''a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations,""' and as such serves as a benchmark by which state
behavior is to be judged. According to one commentator, "its
level at which it was concluded, many observers think it may become in fact one of
the most widely quoted sources of customary international law." Russell, supra note
1, at 248.
It is ironic to note that the state which has initially suggested some legal force for
the Final Act is the Soviet Union, while Soviet legal theory de-emphasizes the role of
custom in international law. Lukashuk, Sources of Present-Day InternationalLaw, in
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 164, 174-79 (G. Tunkin ed. 1969).
173. Some of the similarities between these documents have been discussed supra
in Section 1I.
174. BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 32; see also statement of the French delegate to
the Third Committee on the Declaration as "authoritative interpretation," quoted in
BISHOP, supra note 168, at 469 n.21.
175. In the Preamble to the Declaration on Principles, para. 4, it is stressed that
the principles "are in conformity with the Charter of the U.N.;" in addition, there are
numerous references throughout the document to the Charter, the Universal Declaration, and the Friendly Relations Declaration.
176. Preamble, para. 8.
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political authority is now second only to that of the Charter
itself."' 77 This is not to say that states do not violate its provisions-and a look at any day's newspaper would certify that
they do violate them-but it does provide a strong political and
moral basis for protest and criticism of such violations. When
a state commits itself publicly to a formulation of a policy, that
formulation cannot be lightly set aside, even when not legally
binding."'7
This approach to the results of the CSCE has been stressed
by many commentators, as well as by President Ford. His
statement expresses well the potential uses of the Final Act:
"We are getting a public commitment . . . and establishing a
yardstick by which the world can measure how well they [the
Soviet Union] live up to these stated intentions.""'7 This is
particularly valid for the human contacts basket, where this
kind of specific evaluation device has not existed previously. 8 '
Again, this is no guarantee of compliance, but such detailed
provisions will be valuable in evaluating the performance of
each participating State.'
A further political point that has often been lost in the
discussions of the CSCE is that by discussing issues of human
rights and contacts in a multilateral forum, and agreeing to
2 to achieve
work, independently and jointly, where necessary, S
177. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 624 (N. Leech, C. Oliver & J. Sweeney eds.
1973).
178. As Professor Franck has written, the pronouncements of states are "part of
that trellis of reciprocal expectations on which the fragile international system grows."
Franck, Word Made Law: The Decision of the ICJ in the Nuclear Test Cases, 69 AM.
J. INT'L L. 612, 616 (1975); see also T. FRANCK & E. WEISRAND, WORD POLITICS 120-21
(1971).
179. Denver Post, July 25, 1975, at 16, col. 3; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug.
4, 1975, at 18.
180. Basket Three is 33 pages long and contains detailed provisions such as the
two pages of recommendations on the improvement of working conditions of journalists, including the easing of travel restrictions, restrictions on personal contacts, and
facilitating visas, etc. Section 2(c) of the Declaration on Cooperation in Humanitarian
and Other Fields.
181. The point was well made by a U.S. official: "There is no court to take
anybody into, but this document gives us some moral authority for saying 'You agreed.
Why are you not living up to your word?'" TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 22.
182. Preamble, para. 3 states: "Determined therefore to cooperate among themselves, irrespective of their political, economic and social systems, in order to create
better conditions in the above fields, to develop and strengthen existing forms of
cooperation and to work out new ways and means appropriate to those aims . .. ."
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the objectives set out in the Final Act, the participating States,
and the Soviet Union in particular, have recognized that these
issues are not purely internal matters, to be shielded from international concern." 3 The invocation of the notions of "noninterference" and "domestic jurisdiction"'8 4 has been the standard Soviet response to the raising of human rights questions,
as evidenced by the fate of the Trade Act of 1974, and the
Jackson Amendment." 5 Such a claim, while likely to be
raised,' 8 is less powerful in light of multilateral discussions of
the issues, as at Helsinki.
Another point in this regard, alluded to earlier,'87 concerns
the explicit recognition by the parties to the Final Act that
issues of human contacts contribute to "the strengthening of
peace." Issues of peace and security, are, by definition, subjects of international concern; tying human rights to peace and
security is a means of changing what otherwise might be coninto issues on which internasidered issues of internal concern
188
tional consideration is proper.
Governments are not insensitive to world public opinion"'-whatever it is conceived to be-especially to claims of
illegality or immorality. Commentators have long been impressed-and generally dismayed-by how international law
and moral principles can be marshalled for totally contradictory policies. An important corollary is often overlooked. Such
uses of international law emphasize the importance govern183. Russell, supra note 1, at 260. See generally J. FAWCETT, THE LAW OF NATIONS
136 (1968); GRIEG, supra note 159, at 314-15; J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 357 (6th
ed. H. Waldock 1963). As these authorities demonstrate, a treaty undertaking in a
particular area removes that area from "domestic jurisdiction." The same argument,
though less definitively accepted, can be made for the case of Basket Three of the Final
Act.
184. Fawcett, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction,in THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 286 (E. Luard ed. 1967); GRIEG, supra note 159, at 31822.
185. See note 50 supra.
186. As Professor Fawcett has pointed out, "the old Adam of sovereignty, the sire
of domestic jurisdiction remains a potent force in the present international system."
Fawcett, supra note 184, at 302.
187. See Section I.C supra.
188. As, for example, in the case of South Africa and the U.N.'s fight against
apartheid. South Africa's racial policies have often been termed "a threat to the
peace," which triggers art. 39 and Security Council involvement.
189. Bilder, The InternationalPromotionof Human Rights, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 728,
733 (1964).
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ments attach to the appearance, if not the substance, of
legality, legitimacy and morality. 190
An example of this phenomenon is presented by the Soviet
Union's seeming obsession with a European security conference
as the legitimation of post-war expansion and hegemony. Even
when, as argued earlier, the essence of that goal Was already
achieved, Brezhnev continued to press for the CSCE, as something approaching a surrogate peace conference for Europe. 9 '
That the Soviet Union has felt the need to have formal ratification of its acquisitions suggests at least some sensitivity to
legality and morality in international relations.'92
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Much has been written about the current detente'9 3 between the United States and the Soviet Union.'94 There have
been calls for a "national debate" on detente. 9 ' The dissatisfaction-the malaise of which Professor Korbel speaks in his
lecture' 96-is widespread, and criticism of the policy of detente
190. Stern, Morality and International Order, in THE BASES

OF INTERNATIONAL

ORDER 133, 139, 154 (A. James ed. 1973).

191. Reportedly when asked by then-Chancellor Brandt why the Soviet Union
placed such emphasis on the CSCE, General Secretary Brezhnev responded, "We want
a document." TIME, Aug. 4, 1975, at 18.
192. In addition, that it was felt necessary to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia publicly-and especially in light of the major repurcussions and criticisms of the
Brezhnev Doctrine-should not be forgotten.
193. The fact that the period of detente brought about by the Nixon Administration is not the first such period is often forgotten. This historical perspective is stressed
in STEIBEL, supra note 47, at 4-10; Pipes, Detente: Moscow's View, in SOVIET STRATEGY
IN EUROPE 12-18 (R. Pipes ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Pipes].
194. See, e.g., NurrTER, supra note 56; V. PETROV, DETENTE: PAST AND PRESENT
(1975); Pipes, supra note 193; G. BALL, DIPLOMACY FOR A CROWDED WORLD chs. 6, 7
(1976); STEIBEL, supra note 47; Shulman, The Future of the Soviet-American
Competition, in SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND WORLD ORDER: THE TWO AND THE
MANY 1 (Adelphi Paper No. 66, 1970); Birnbaum, The Future of the Soviet and American InternationalSystems, in id. at 24; Sommer, Detente and Security: The Options,
in

EUROPE AND AMERICA IN THE 1970s: I: BETWEEN DETENTE AND CONFRONTATION 10

(Adelphi Paper No. 70, 1970); Tatu, The East: Detente and Confrontation,in id. at
17; GOLDMAN,

supra note 47; J. KORBEL, DETENTE IN EUROPE:

REAL OR IMAGINARY?

(1972); Yergin, In Faint Praiseof Detente, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 29, 1976, at 17

[hereinafter cited as Yergin]; Rosecrance, Detente or Entente?, 53 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
464 (1975); Conquest, supra note 56; Morris, Detente, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, May 30,
1976, at 7; Salter, It Takes Two to Detente: or Can Russia Change Its Spots?, 9 INT'L
LAW. 517 (1975); Draper, Detente, 57 COMMENTARY 25 (1974); Kennan, Is Detente
Worth Saving?, SATURDAY REVIEW, Mar. 6, 1976, at 12.

195. E.g., Egan, Kissinger Seeks, and Gets, a "Detente" Debate, Nat'l Observer,
Feb. 14, 1976, at 3, col. 1.
196. Korbel, Detente and World Order, 6 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 9, 13 (1976),
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as pursued by the Nixon and Ford Administrations has come
from all sides.'97
The disillusionment with detente derives basically, as Professor Korbel argues, from the differing perceptions of detente
held by the United States and the Soviet Union. 9 ' The misperception by Americans of what detente is, and what it can
achieve, stems from two main factors. The first is the tendency
discussed by Professor Korbel for Americans to clutch at "easy
answers.""' The second is the nature of the diplomacy practiced by the Nixon Administration, and the way that detente
was "sold" to the American public.
To the American people, detente appeared to be the end
of the Cold War, the beginning of a "new relationship" of cooperation, and, perhaps, friendship between the Soviet Union
and the United States. 200 The Soviets frequently argue that
detente is "irreversible, 20 ' and the American public seemed to
accept this interpretation. Furthermore, it was seen-or more
accurately, hoped-that this detente governed all aspects of
relations between the two states-that is, political, military,
economic and ideological relations-everywhere in the world.
Thus, when Soviet writers stress that there is no "cessation of
the ideological struggle,"' 202 this is seen to discredit the entire
policy of detente. Soviet "adventurism" (as it is characterized
in the West)-or legitimate support for national liberation
movements (as seen from Moscow)-in Angola further reinforces the disillusionment.
The disenchantment is frequently expressed in the proposition that detente is a "one-way street," that concessions by
supra in this issue [hereinafter cited as Korbel].
197. See, e.g., BALL, supra note 194, at chs. 7, 8; NuTrrER, supra note 56; A.
SAKHAROV, MY COUNTRY AND THE WORLD (1975).
198. Korbel, supra note 196, at 13. This point is also argued persuasively by
Richard Pipes in Pipes, supra note 193; see also PETROV, supra note 194, at 3-5. Petrov
refers to the "asymmetry of national objectives." Id. at 3.
199. Korbel, supra note 196, at 13.
200. Yergin, supra note 194, at 21. He cites former Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger's warning that, "detente means [to many minds thatl the possibility of
conflict has ended and we could afford unilaterally to disarm." Id.
201. Shattan, How the Soviets See Detente, NEw LEADER, Feb. 2, 1976, at 8, 9.
202. Arbatov, Maneuvers of the Opponents of Detente, CURRENT DIGEST OF THE
SOVIET PRESS, Oct. 1, 1975, at 1, 5. See quotations cited in Korbel, supra note 196, at
17-18.
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the West in the political, military, economic and ideological
2
spheres are not matched by reciprocal Soviet concessions.
Without denying that in some cases negotiations were not balanced, much of this criticism stems from the misperceptions of,
and unrealistically high expectations for the policy of detente.
The second set of factors leading to the disillusionment
with the policy are direct results of the Nixon-Kissinger way of
practicing diplomacy. As one analyst has put it, "Detente is
now suffering from the fact that it was deliberately obscured
as diplomacy and oversold as politics."2 °4 The personalization
of foreign policy-by both Nixon and Kissinger-was useful as
a means of selling policy, but as the personalities fell from
favor, the policy-regardless of its merits (which was often the
way it was accepted)-has been denigrated in the public eye
as well. 0 5 Further, the penchant for secrecy and surprise of the
Nixon years contributed to this disillusionment. Perhaps most
damaging was the molding of the policy of detente to meet
domestic purposes, most often, domestic political purposes.0 6
One of the major costs of detente which led to more disillusionment was in America's relations with Western Europe and
Japan. Draper, among others, has argued that detente, as pursued, was "the attempt to solve our problems through our antagonists, without, or even at the expense of, our friends. Conceivably, we might have tried to bolster both fronts simultaneously, but this effort was never seriously made." 207 A further,
and still continuing problem is the total eclipse of Third World
relations by "super power politics."
The disillusionment, and the connection of detente in
many minds with discredited persons, have "gone beyond a
healthy deflation of the Nixon Administration's puffed-up
rhetoric and now are swinging towards an indiscriminate and
203. See, e.g., Yergin, supra note 194, at 18.
204. Morris, supra note 194, at 7.
205. Yergin, supra note 194, at 21, argues this well.
206. Morris, supra note 194, at 40. See J. SCHELL, THE TIME OF ILLUSION 246-47
(1976). Schell argues that the "image" of policy and of governing was the prime force
behind Nixon policies. "President Nixon's reaffirmation of the doctrine of credibility
disclosed in this foreign policy a practice that had come to govern most of his domestic
policies: the practice of subordinating the substance of governing to the image of
governing." Id. at 66. Thus it is argued that shortcomings in SALT I were the result
of the political need for the agreement rather than the merits of the positions.
207. Draper, supra note 194, at 44.

1976

CSCE

AND DitTENTE

short-sighted hardening of our positions."8 Thus the aim of
discussion of the policy of detente must be to attempt, while
eliminating illusions-"about its limits, about the character of
the Soviet system or the expansionist elements in Soviet foreign policy" 2 0 -to develop the full potentialities of detente.
Secretary Kissinger has written that "[d]etente is a pro2 1 That is, contrary to the
cess, not a permanent achievement.""
Soviet conception,"' detente is not irreversible, as past periods
of detente demonstrate."' Further, different aspects of relations, in different geographical areas, between the Soviet Union
and the United States do not progress, or regress, at the same
pace. Thus, the author believes that detente is not best approached as one concept, but rather, it must be analyzed in its
various aspects, as well as in specific geographical contexts.
Contrary to the simplistic conceptions of "indivisible" detente,
the policy can best be understood and pursued by approaching
each area separately.
The Final Act, then, by dividing the results of the CSCE
into three baskets-political, economic, and humanitarian-is
instructive."' We shall discuss each in turn. This is not to argue
that there is no "linkage" among the fields, for relations in one
area certainly affect other areas. In many cases, these linkages
have negative effects in other areas. For example, the United
States cancelled its participation in bilateral meetings on
trade, energy and housing because of Soviet activity in Angola. 1' If these meetings have any value, to subject them to the
uncertainties and instability of political relations seems unwise.
Political detente is based upon recognition of the realities
of a nuclear world. "Detente is an imperative. In a world shad208. Shulman, Prioritiesfor Detente, 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 42 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Shulman].
209. Yergin, supra note 194, at 21.
210. Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., Apr. 14, 1974, at 518.
Cited in NUTTER, supra note 56, at 91.
211. See, e.g., Shattan, How the Soviets See Detente, NEw LEADER, Feb. 2, 1976,
at 8, 9.
212. See note 193 supra.
213. Professor Korbel analyzed detente in this manner in J. KORBEL, DETENTE IN
EUROPE: REAL OR IMAOINARY?

(1972). He entitled chapters: "Politics," "Economics,"

and "Ideology" (which I shall argue is where humanitarian concerns will fall).
214. TIME, Mar. 29, 1976, at 31; Denver Post, Mar. 16, 1976, at 1, col. 2.

152

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW AND POLICY

VOL. 6:122

owed by the danger of nuclear holocaust, there is no rational
alternative to the pursuit of relaxation of tensions." ' It is a
relaxation-not an end-to tensions. And it is a relaxation that
can be reversed. It is contended that if this is all that detente
accomplishes, then it is little different from Cold War." l'
Most commentators recognize "stages" of detente, from
the very limited conception of avoidance of war to positive and
cooperative relations."7 Generally, the detente between the
Soviet Union and the United States has not progressed much
beyond the point of conflict avoidance and crisis-limitation.'
Further, it is in different stages in different areas of the world.
Thus in Europe, where the fear of nuclear confrontation has
been greatest, a fairly high degree of detente has been achieved,
as evidenced by the CSCE. In areas of the Third World, on the
other hand, proxy wars, while not ruled out, are to be limited
so as to prevent the risk of nuclear confrontation. Thus, Soviet
acquiescence in the mining of Haiphong harbor in May 1972
(two weeks before President Nixon's first visit to Moscow) 19
provides a better example of the workings of detente than does
Kissinger's appraisal of the Angolan situation as "Soviet ad-

venturism. "220
This is what Secretary Kissinger terms a "dual policy that
simultaneously and with equal vigor resists expansionist drives
and seeks to shape a more constructive relationship. '221 As the
critics of detente contend, the intentions of the Soviet Union
are not substantially different today then they were in the period before President Nixon.2 22 Tactical considerations make
detente the best policy at the moment, but as circumstances
change, so too might Soviet perceptions of tactical advantage
215. Kissinger, cited in NuTTER, supra note 56, at 87. See also Kissinger's speech
of Feb. 3, 1976, reprinted in 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 20 (1976); Shulman, supra note
208, at 43-44. Cf. Pipes, supra note 193, at 5. "We are told that detente is vital because
the only alternative to it is a nuclear holocaust. This, however, is an appeal to fear,
not to reason." Id. at 5.
216. Draper, supra note 194, at 38.
217. Id.; Kissinger speech in 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 20, 22-23 (1976).
218. Detente in Check, 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 45 (1976).
219. GOLDMAN, supra note 47, at 36; KULSKI, supra note 1, at 438-40.
220. Denver Post, Mar. 16, 1976, at 1, col. 2. Indeed Kissinger's attempts to match
Soviet involvement was in line with this approach, but he was only prevented by
Congressional disapproval.
221. Kissinger speech, 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 20, 22-23 (1976).
222. Pipes, supra note 193, at 9-10.
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change. Detente then "involves making somewhat more explicit the implicit rules of the Cold War-that neither side will
push too hard in areas of the other's vital interests; that some
effort will be made to contain crises; that both sides will cooperate in avoiding nuclear war." 2 3
It also involves a higher level of communication between
the leaderships of the two countries,2 4 which serves to enhance
the function discussed above. It further involves "atmospherics, 1 22 or the perceptions of better relations. It is argued that
perhaps the atmospherics outdistance the real achievements,
leading to disarray in the West and reluctance to fully understand Soviet moves and build-ups.
The most important part of detente in this field is the
separate discussions of SALT and MBFR, which will-if concluded-contribute substantially to a true lessening of tensions, and a meaningful curtailment of the technologies that
threaten the peace. The political pronouncements have been
made; it is now time to see if concrete results, seriously bargained, can be obtained. Whether this can be accomplished
lacking the trust of which Professor Korbel spoke, 2 remains to
be seen.
Detente also means cooperative efforts, which Secretary
Kissinger says will lead to a "pattern of relations" and a "pattern of restraint" that will bring about the higher stages of
detente. This "network of vested interests" is in large part in
2
the field of economics. 2
In the matter of economics, an important distinction must
be made between trade and what is more accurately considered
aid. 22 1 By trade is meant normal commercial transactions,
goods for cash, or goods for goods exchanges. This is contrasted
to what is in reality aid, that is credits, often long-term and on
lenient terms. 29 The distinction may be fuzzy at times, but it
is nevertheless valid.
223. Yergin, supra note 194, at 17.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Korbel, supra note 196, at 18.
227. Kissinger speech, 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 20, 24-25 (1976).
228. This distinction is recognized by G. KENNAN, ON DEALING WITH THE COMMUNIST WORLD 31 (1964) [hereinafter cited as KENNAN]; Draper, supra note 194, at 31-32.
229. KENNAN, supra note 228, at 31; Draper, supra note 194, at 32.
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As George Kennan has argued, "The problem of EastWest trade is, in short, primarily a political problem, and
should be approached as such." 30 Thus the decision to pursue
or not to pursue trade with the Soviet Union should be seen as
a political one. There is a further question, however. That is,
if trade is to be pursued, are political goals best served by
allowing trade on economic terms, or should political concerns
govern not just trade generally, but its particular applications?
Kennan also contends that "[t]o demand political concessions as a quid pro quo for normal commercial transactions
is, after all, only another way of renouncing trade altogether;
....

2,31

Trade with the United States-as opposed to aid

from it-is probably not so important to the Soviet Union that
it will yield to political demands in return.2 3 To link trade and
politics, furthermore, would subject each area to the weaknesses and fluctuations of the other. Thus, the linkage is only
as strong as its weakest link. 33 The danger of subjecting political relations to the fluctuations of trade relations (and crop
yields) is apparent; it is also unwise to allow trade decisions to
be governed by the vagaries of political relations.
To subject trade to political conditions in this way is to
deny two important political ramifications of such trade. First,
there is leverage inherent in having trade-trade which is subject to diminution or cancellation if political relations deteriorate badly. There is thus a positive incentive to maintain sta34
bility in the politico-military sphere.
Second, it is argued that trade can have beneficial effects
on the internal system of the U.S.S.R. While this point is often
taken much too far, it can be said that "the inflow of ideas and
goods [and personnel] nevertheless has some impact and provides some momentum for those who otherwise have had no
230. KENNAN, supra note 228, at 31.
231. Id. at 32.
232. Secretary Kissinger has put it like this: "the Soviet Union has survived for
nearly sixty years without American grain; it could do so now. Cutting off grain would
still lose Angola." 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 20, 35 (1976). Kennan argues that the
effect of cutting off trade would, at best, "slow down, to a minor and undecisive extent,
the advance of the Soviet economy." KENNAN, supra note 228, at 30.
233. Berman, supra note 60, at 234.
234. Shulman, supra note 208, at 44. Keatley, The Give and Take of Detente,
Wall St. Journal, Aug. 4, 1975, at 10, col. 4.
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hope for internal liberalization." 3 ' The effect may be small,
but it is likely to be greater than that achieved by demanding
political concessions for trade. 36
The amounts of trade will remain limited due to the lack
of Soviet goods for Western consumers and the chronic shortage
of hard currency in the Soviet Union, "but the market and the
mutual needs are there.""2 7 In addition to the political advantages of trade, the United States can benefit economically from
trade with the Soviet Union. Not only does the balance of trade
benefit, 38 but individual enterprises, workers and farmers ben3
efit as well. 1
Aid-long-term credits, easy financing, etc.-presents a
different picture. The Soviet Union needs, because of its inefficient economic structure, Western technology and capital. For
much of this, the United States is often the only, or the best,
source-unlike the case with consumer goods. Thus, the bargaining position of the United States is much better than in the
trade area. The United States has no moral or other obligation
to supply aid to the Soviet Union, as it arguably does to LDCs.
Further, as the economic benefit is more tenuous and longterm, and the bolstering of the Soviet economy greater,
political considerations should weigh more heavily in such
decision-making.
Will the Soviet Union accept political conditions on aid?
Professor Goldman has concluded that "under the proper conditions economic pressure can be used to win political concessions, particularly when the Soviet Union is in economic
need. 2 0 As the Soviet Union's economic position improves,
their willingness to make concessions decreases, but the need
for credits and technology, generally, can be expected to continue for some time.
What kind of concessions should be sought from the Soviet
Union? The author believes that to seek politico-military concessions would be risky. As we have argued previously, for polsupra note 47, at 280. See also MEDVEDEV, supra note 139, at 320-

235.

GOLDMAN,

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

GOLDMAN, supra note 47, at 280.

21.
Id. at 267. Cf. Conquest, supra note 56.
Id. at 276; Yergin, supra note 194, at 19.
GOLDMAN, supra note 47, at 276-77. Cf. Conquest, supra note 56.
GOLDMAN, supra note 47, at 69.
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itical detente to be meaningful, there must be that level of trust
that leads to sound bargaining."' That trust and those bargains
cannot and should not be "bought." As Professor Goldman
cautions, "it must never be forgotten that the minute the Russians feel they no longer need American goods [credits] or
technology, their purchases from the United States may dry up
as they did in the 1930s and the 1940s." ' 2 So too could previously made concessions "dry up" as Soviet needs decrease.
To have, for example, a SALT agreement subject to such an
uncertain future would introduce instability into the political
arena that is highly undesirable and potentially dangerous. As
we shall see, changes brought about in the human rights area
are less easily shut off, and would have more lasting effects.
The failure of the United States to take an active human
2 3
rights position throughout the world has been noted for years.
The reluctance of the U.S. Government to denounce human
rights violations in the period of detente was been criticized
particularly strongly.2 14 Pursuit of human rights objectives has
been seen to "interfere" with political objectives in relations
with the Soviet Union.
What the Final Act of the CSCE does is demonstrate that
human rights concerns are of an international nature, that they
are appropriate for international negotiations, and that they
are seen as an integral part of the Western conception of detente.
The Soviet Union continually stresses that there is no
"ideological cease-fire,

2 5

and there is little reason to expect

that stance to change, given Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Rather
than decry this attitude and do nothing, perhaps it would be
best for the West to accept this formulation, and pursue the
"ideological struggle." By this, the author does not mean a
return to Cold War rhetoric. As one commentator has written:
Since the Soviets do not seem to be dismantling this twilight
apparatus, perhaps the West needs to become more sophisticated
in coping with the dialectics and semantics of this form of elec241. Korbel, supra note 196, at 18; J.
250 (1972).

KORBEL, DETENTE IN EUROPE: REAL OR

IMAGINARY?

242.
243.
244.
245.

GOLDMAN, supra note 47, at 283.
See, e.g., the excellent Symposium, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 591 et seq. (1974).
See note 50 supra.
See Korbel, supra note 196, at 17-18.
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toral struggle. Not with the crude anti-Communist sloganeering
of the past, but with more subtle discourse and more credible
symbols which we are capable of evolving. Surely we need not
fear to engage in a wide spectrum of East-West contacts on this
front, even though our adversaries are trained Marxists: for the
West has learned to live with dissent and pluralism and controversy and the East is very wary indeed of that sort of engagement."'6

By the "ideological struggle," we mean the struggle of ideas
and political freedoms, pursued by the flow of people and information.
It is not a struggle with the Soviet Union that the West can
"win." It will be won-if at all-by the people of the U.S.S.R.
Thus if there is to be any liberalization of the Soviet regime, it
will come from within. 2 7 While it cannot be forced from outside, that change can be aided from the West.
First, this can be done by persistently and publicly reminding Moscow of the commitments it has undertaken,
whether in the Final Act, or in the Covenants, or in the Soviet
Constitution. Further, the West should continually evaluate
the performance of the Soviet Union 4 -and this is where the
forum provided by the follow-up conference in Belgrade will be
important. 49 An important step has been taken in the passage
246. Barnett, Comment, in THE NEW ATLANTIC CHALLENGE 232, 233 (R. Mayne ed.
1975).
247. See MEDVEDEV, supra note 139, at 16; Larrabee, supra note 4, at S6606.
248. Of course, the Soviet Union has and will continue to question whether the
United States has "clean hands" in this regard. "Really, what right do they have to
pose as champions of the eternal values of freedom and democracy?-especially in the
light of what has been going on in America in the past few years." Arbatov, Maneuvers
of Opponents of Detente, CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS, Oct. 1, 1975, at 1, 5.
Cf. Manning, Goals, Ideology and ForeignPolicy, 54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 271, 278-84.
In the long view, the surest way for the United States to influence for the
better the ideological future of mankind everywhere is by being sure that
we present an unwavering example of commitment to our principles at
home. And that is an ideological target that can be-has been-set for
all Americans.
Nevertheless, the United States should continuously speak out internationally to reassert its ideological stance on individual freedom and expression. In time, the audience of the world will once more listen and
respond. Id. at 284.
249. Current evidence of compliance by the Soviet Union is sketchy, but seems
to show some compliance, but in selective areas and with limited scope. See Larrabee,
supra note 4, at S6605-06; Radio Free Europe, Six Months After: The East European
Response to Helsinki, 14 THE ATLANTIC COMM. Q. 59 (1976); Evans & Novak, Russ
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of the Case-Fenwick Act,25 which establishes a Commission to

monitor implementation of the Final Act. The author believes
that such a Commission should be established at the NATO
level, or among interested states, as such a body would have
far more impact on the policies of the Soviet Union than would
"'
a unilateral body.25
Second, the United States should use the political leverage
inherent in aid to obtain concessions from the Soviet Union in
this area. Unlike in the political sphere, advances in human
rights are difficult to undo should the economic basis of the
agreement disappear. While access to information may be cut
off, what has already passed is in the hearts and minds of
people, and cannot be expunged.2

12

Further, the process of

samizdat would allow continued circulation of information
even if the source were cut off. Likewise, the memories of easier
emigration, or freer travel, are difficult to erase once allowed.
Third, the West should continue to provide the information to the Soviet people that is denied them by their own
government. This is the most important service that the West
can provide to the Soviet people-the ammunition of the
"ideological struggle" with the Soviet Union.
There are no "easy answers." Detente is a complex, and
often frustrating, phenomenon. It is not the "new relationship"
that so many desire, in the East and in the West; it requires
much the same vigilance that was required by the Cold War.
But it is more than the Cold War; it has the potential to expand
in scope and in application. Higher stages of detente are possible, but they will not be easily achieved, nor are they inevitable. Compared to the alternative of nuclear war, however, it is
a policy that must be pursued.
Douglas G. Scrivner*
Flout Helsinki Agreement, Denver Post, June 21, 1976, at 18, col. 5. See also remarks
of Congressman Drinan, CONG. REC. H4435 (daily ed. May 17, 1976).
250. S.2679. See CONG. REC. S6600-09 (daily ed. May 5, 1976); CONG. REc. H443244 (daily ed. May 17, 1976).
251. Remarks of Congressman Derwinski, CONG. REC. H4436 (daily ed. May 17,
1976).
252. See MEDVEDEV, supra note 139, at 315. "Ideas that take possession of the
masses are now almost directly capable of becoming a 'material force.'" Id.
* A.B., 1973, Duke University; M.Sc., 1974, London School of Economics; J.D.
candidate, University of Denver College of Law; Ph.D. candidate, Graduate School of
International Studies, University of Denver.

